Sem 1, 2024

• Week 1 , Feb 21
• Speaker: Emanuel Viebahn, (FU Berlin)
• Title: Is lying morally wrong?
• Abstract: While few hold that lying is always morally wrong all things considered, many take lying to be pro tanto (or prima facie) morally wrong. This talk will explore whether the view that lying is pro tanto morally wrong can be grounded in features essential to lying. The talk will focus on two features commonly thought to be essential to lying: deceptive intent and assertoric responsibility. Taking into account recent work on the nature of lying and assertion, I will argue there are cases in which neither deceptive intent nor assertoric responsibility can ground the pro tanto moral wrongness of lying.
• Week 2 , Feb 28
• Speaker: Kyle Blumberg, (University of Melbourne)
• Title: Fictional Reality (joint work with Ben Holguín)
• Abstract: This paper defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes' head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what's true in a work of fiction. We argue that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. We contrast our view with one of the dominant approaches to fictional truth, which originates with David Lewis. Along the way we explore the relationship between fiction, counterfactuals, and vagueness.
• Week 3 , Mar 6
• Speaker: Peter Millican, (Oxford University and National University of Singapore)
• Title: Hume and Hájek on Miracles
• Abstract: My aim here is to outline and then assess the force of Hume’s famous argument against the credibility of testimony for miracles, particularly in the light of Alan Hájek’s influential recent defence of the argument against what he describes as ‘the single most common sort of objection’ to it. Hájek’s defence, I maintain, hinges on a confusion between prior and posterior probabilities (of which there is also a hint in Hume’s text), and once this is recognised, we can see that Hume’s “general maxim” cannot easily be revised to evade the objection. The principle behind Hume’s argument nevertheless retains significant force against testimony for events that are acknowledged to be initially improbable (with various significant caveats regarding ‘analogical probability’ which Hájek insightfully explores). But it is not clear that this force can legitimately be carried over – as Hume seems to assume – to the case of miracles as he defines them. Instead, I suggest, rational rejection of miracles depends primarily on rejection of the ‘invisible agents’ that are supposed to perform them, appealing more to the considerations in the second ‘a posteriori’ part of Hume’s essay than to the ‘a priori’ first part.
• Week 4 , Mar 13
• Speaker: Anna Smajdor, (University of Oslo)
• Title: Epigenetics and the non-identity problem
• Abstract: The ‘non-identity problem’ has profoundly influenced the ways in which philosophers think about harm in reproductive ethics. Suppose, for example, that a woman is undergoing treatment for syphilis. If she becomes pregnant now, rather than waiting until she is cured, the child will suffer from congenital syphilis. Derek Parfit suggests that our intuition that the child is harmed if the woman fails to wait, is false. If she waits, she will have a different child: one conceived with different gametes. Parfit’s point has been taken by many commentators, to indicate a specifically genetic account of identity. But with increased understanding of epigenetics, it is not so clear that genetic identity is fixed from conception. A variety of environmental factors determine whether specific genes are silenced, or active before conception and after, and to what degree. This process - epigenetics - calls into question the relationship between genes and identity. Accordingly, the distinction between harmful and identity-changing genetic interventions becomes difficult to sustain. In this paper, I will explore several approaches to understanding the relationship between genes, harm and identity, in ways that preserve our fundamental intuitions. Ultimately, I conclude that it is not possible to sustain both a genetic understanding of identity, and a belief that some genetic interventions are harmful (or therapeutic) and others identity-changing, whether in the conception phase or afterwards.
• Week 5 , Mar 20
• Speaker: Brian Epstein, (Tufts)
• Title: How to theorize about social construction
• Abstract: The claim that basic kinds and categories in the world are “socially constructed” is perennially debated in philosophy and social theory. Over the years, lots of categories—races, genders, sexes, morality, commodities, corporations, and many more—have been put forward as cases of social construction. But what is social construction, and how is a theory of social construction to be developed and assessed? I propose a framework for understanding the metaphysics of social entities by distinguishing questions of social construction (i.e., what socially constructs the entity to be what it is) from questions about the characteristics of the entity (i.e., what is the product of social construction). Focusing on the former, I consider families of theories of social construction and argue for the demands that a theory of social construction should meet.
• Week 6 , Mar 27
• Speaker: Sam Shpall, (University of Sydney)
• Title: Limerence
• Abstract: I explore the psychologist Dorothy Tennov's (1979) largely neglected account of limerence—or, very roughly, the experience of being in love. I argue that several core features of Tennov's account are distinctive and insightful; that the concept of limerence helps us address deep confusion in our thinking about sex and love; and that reflecting on limerence may give us useful perspective on significant relationship practices like cohabitation, monogamy, and co-parenting.
• Week 7 , Apr 10
• Speaker: Alex Kocurek, (Cornell)
• Title: Verbal Disputes and Metadisputes
• Abstract: Impasses in philosophical discourse often prompt us to question the very nature of the dispute at hand. Is there a fact of the matter as to which side is right? Or does the answer simply turn on, as Carnap would put it, a choice of linguistic framework? Such questions have given rise to metadisputes, which, ironically, have become just as intractable as the first-order disputes they are about. This talk explores the possibility that these metadisputes themselves might be verbal. I propose a general framework for analyzing verbal disputes that can shed light on this possibility and argue that identifying whether a dispute is verbal ultimately hinges on one’s metasemantic views and that, in some instances, might entail there is no factual resolution to the question. I’ll consider how to theorize about such higher-order matters and explore some of the ramifications this view would have for philosophical methodology.
• Week 8 , Apr 17
• Speaker: Jordi Fernandez, (University of Adelaide)
• Title: Imagination and the paradox of fiction
• Abstract: When we engage with fiction, we seem to have emotions towards fictional characters. However, one would think that, in order to have an emotion towards someone, it is necessary to believe that they are real. And we do not believe that fictional characters are real. I argue that a solution to this puzzle can be found in a certain view about imaginative content. This is the view that, when one reads about a situation or an event involving some fictional character, and one forms a mental image as a result, what one imagines, strictly speaking, is that if one experienced the relevant situation or event, then that experience would be, for one, like having the mental image that one is entertaining. I motivate this view, and use it to propose a solution to the paradox of fiction. The proposal is that, when we engage with fiction, we do not have emotions towards fictional characters after all. At best, we entertain those emotions by having other higher-order mental states which are about them, namely, our imaginative episodes. The proposed solution, I argue, can explain why it feels to us as if we are having emotions towards fictional characters when we engage with fiction, and why, nevertheless, we are not disposed to behave in any particular way towards those characters.
• Week 9 , Apr 24
• Speaker: Glen Pettigrove, (University of Glasgow)
• Title: The Well-Tempered Musician: On the Virtue of Obedience and the Value of Tradition
• Abstract: At the time Thomas Aquinas wrote the Summa Theologia, no one would have been surprised to find him arguing that obedience is a moral virtue. They are not even likely to have been taken aback by the claim that it ‘is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues’ (ST II-II, Q 104, A 3). Eight centuries later, the situation is decidedly different. Far from arguing for its pre-eminence, the average 21st century western reader is more likely to be sceptical about the claim that obedience is a virtue. We will admit that in some domains a readiness to take orders is necessary, such as within a military command structure. But even here we are likely to think it more a necessary evil than a kind of excellence. The one exception might be among children, and it is a trait we expect them to grow out of. Against this backdrop, Christine Swanton’s recent call for virtue theorists to revive the virtue of obedience will come as a surprise (2021, 270-271). Swanton recommends thinking about obedience as a role-based virtue. This strikes us as promising. If there is such a virtue, it makes sense to think of it as partly defined by social roles. Our aim is to explore the contours of obedience and consider whether it can help us address a lively debate in the philosophy of music regarding the obligations of classical performers.
• Week 10 , May 1
• Speaker: Inês Hipólito, (Macquarie University)
• Title: The Human Roots of AI
• Abstract: In the era of intertwined human and AI-generated content, understanding their impact on cultural practices is crucial. AI-driven decision-making systems significantly influence cognition and societal well-being, yet biases towards Western perspectives risk neglecting diverse knowledge systems and cultural identities. Philosophical inquiries into AI's ontology raise profound societal implications, while viewing AI as a cultural product offers insights into its reciprocal relationship with cultural practices. This paper explores the interplay among culture, cognition, and AI to understand their implications for knowledges, cultural identities, and human narratives.
• Week 11 , May 8
• Speaker: Alex Lefebvre, (University of Sydney)
• Title: Liberalism as a Way of Life
• Abstract: This presentation is based on my forthcoming book, Liberalism as a Way of Life, and is about how liberal values and practices can be the basis for a personal worldview, way of living, and spiritual orientation. You don’t have to be liberal and something else, such as Christian, Buddhist, Kantian, hedonist, utilitarian, or whatever else. It is fully possible and rewarding to be liberal through and through. This means that the values and attitudes enshrined in liberal political institutions, and ubiquitous in the background culture of liberal democracies – such as reciprocity, tolerance, personal freedom, impartiality, equality of opportunity, and irony – have the potential to inform a much more general sensibility, one that is supple enough to be realized in all different aspects of life: from family to the workplace, from friendship to enmity, from humour to outrage, and everything in between.
• Note: Alexandre Lefebvre is Professor of Politics and Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He is the author of Liberalism as a Way of Life (Princeton 2024), Human Rights and the Care of the Self (Duke 2018), Human Rights as a Way of Life: on Bergson’s Political Philosophy (Stanford 2013), and The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza(Stanford 2008).
• Week 12 , May 15
• Speaker: Thomas Corbin, (Macquarie University)
• Week 13 , May 22
• Speaker: Luara Ferracioli, (University of Sydney)
• Title: Justice in Gestation and Moral Integrity: A Dilemma
• Abstract: Political philosophers have recently turned to the topic of justice in gestation, emphasising that the uterine environment contributes to future health outcomes and talents enjoyed in adulthood. In this presentation, I argue that bringing justice to bear on gestation is more difficult than it may seem at first glance. The fact that there are no unmediated channels between foetuses and the state makes foetuses among the least accessible subjects of justice. It also means that for the state to protect the interests of foetuses, it must command full compliance on the part of pregnant women, which comes at a very high cost to this group. I show that even the most plausible principle of justice in gestation leads to the state demanding the unthinkable from some of its citizens. I conclude the discussion by defending a solution that allows the state to realise justice for biological parents and their foetuses.
• Week 18 , June 26
• Speaker: Catharine Abell, (Oxford University)
• Title: Artistic Medium and the Ontology of Art

Sem 2, 2024

• Week -1 , July 17
• Speaker: Seth Lazar, (ANU)
• Title: What, if anything, should we do, now, about catastrophic AI risk?
• Abstract: The recent acceleration in public understanding of AI capabilities has been matched by growing concern about its potentially catastrophic, even existential risks. From presidents and industry leaders, to policy wonks and 'thought leaders', the alarm about AI risks has been sounded—and the public is taking notice. Meanwhile, five (perhaps six) of the seven most valuable companies globally are pursuing Artificial General Intelligence, the very technology viewed by many as posing such risks. This cognitive dissonance raises questions: How should we think about catastrophic AI risk? And what, if anything, should we do? I will argue we must differentiate between risks posed by existing AI systems and their incremental improvements, and those contingent on a significant scientific breakthrough. We should prioritize the former not due to their greater stakes, but because understanding a technology is a prerequisite for mitigating its risks without incurring excessive costs. While we should not dismiss the risks posed by hypothetical future AI systems, our most prudent course for addressing them is to cultivate resilient institutions and adaptable research communities that can evolve as our knowledge expands.
• Week 0 , July 24
• Speaker: Neil Mehta, (Yale-NUS College)
• Week 1 , July 31
• Speaker: Sukaina Hirji, (University of Pennsylvania)
• Week 2 , Aug 7
• Speaker: Anca Gheaus, (Central European University)
• Week 3 , Aug 14
• Speaker: TBA
• Week 4 , Aug 21
• Speaker: TBA
• Week 5 , Aug 28
• Speaker: Hannah Tierney, (University of California, Davis)
• Week 6 , Sep 4
• Speaker: TBA
• Week 7 , Sep 11
• Speaker: TBA
• Week 8 , Sep 18
• Speaker: David Glick, (University of California, Davis)
• Week 9 , Sep 25
• Speaker: David Bronstein, (University of Notre Dame (Sydney))
• Week 10 , Oct 9
• Speaker: David Plunkett, (Dartmouth)
• Week 11 , Oct 16
• Speaker: TBA
• Week 12 , Oct 23
• Speaker: Sean Donahue, (ANU)
• Week 13 , Oct 30
• Speaker: TBA